Sunday, June 10, 2012

Bharatkalyan97: Beauty of the confluences of rivers

Bharatkalyan97: Beauty of the confluences of rivers: 1. Confluence of the Rhone and Arve Rivers in Geneva, Switzerland 2. Confluence of the Ilz, Danube, and Inn Rivers in Passau, Germany ...

Saturday, June 9, 2012

All the members of the court are considered as wounded, where justice is found wounded with inequity,



The Hon’ble Court been conscious of its constitutional obligation issued effective orders to ensure the protection of the environment.. The human rights people and environmental activists have approach to the Hon’ble Court through Public Interest Litigation to protect the interest of the general public
The upstream environmental and economical impacts are: -
  1. So
    IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
    *********
    CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION NO.  4003 OF 2006
    (Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India)
    DISTRICT, ALLAHABAD
    Harchetan Branhchari Ji Mahraj, Sri   Paramnand Ashram, Teakar Mafi,Amathi, District Sultanpur at Present Residing at Jhoosi, Post Jhoosi, Dist. Allahabad  ………………………………………………………………….Petitioner.
                                                                Versus
    1.    State of U. P. through Secretary,
    Environment, Government of U. P.
    Secretariat, Lucknow (U. P.)
    2.    The Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad.
    3.    The Collector, Allahabad, Dist. Allahabad.
    4.    The Mala Officer Incharge, Magh Mela, Allahabad.
    5.    State Board for Prevantation and control of water
    Pollution through its Chairmen                                ……………………..Respondents
    To,
    The Hon’ble The Chief Justice and his Lordship’s other companion Judges of this Hon’ble Court.
                The humble application of the applicant submits the report in the matter of Ganga Pollution   as under:-
    The spiritual sanctity of the water of River Ganga, deeply associated with the rituals and custom of Hindu philosophy, regarding its great traditions; and simultaneously emergence of the dead body or its ashes in holy water, some time provokes me to have an introspection and at that moment, the sound proposition in these verses reminds me of my Duty in this manner:-  
               I am unjust, but I can strive for justice,
        My life’s unkind, but I can vote for kindness.
    I, the un-loving, say life should be lovely,
    I, that am blind, cry against my blindness”.
    “We, the people” are still like cavemen, with our back turn to light, watching the shadow of the wall. There is an iron cage, not having any ventilation and people are living in the state of suffocation, virtually on the verge of their death point. There is a complete apathy of the custodian of the power towards their welfare and in our country "We, the people" who are regarded to be the sovereign of the nation, are living a life full of abrogation and subjugation.
    “All the members of the court are considered as wounded, where justice is found wounded with inequity, and Government do not extract the dart of inequity from justice or remove its blot and destroy inequity, in other words where the innocent are not respected and the criminal are not punished.”
    “A virtuous and just person should never enter a court and when he does so, he should speak the truth; he who holds his tongue on seeing injustice done, or speaks contrary to truth and justice, is the greatest sinner.”
    “Justice destroyed destroys its destroyer; and justice preserved, preserves its preserver.  Hence, never destroy justice, lest being destroyed, it should destroy thee.”
    “In this world justice or righteousness alone is man’s friend that goes with him after death.  All other things or companions part on the destruction of the body and he is detached from all company. But the company of justice is never cut off.”
    “When injustice is done in the government out of partiality, it is divided into four parts of which one is shared by the criminal or doer of injustice, the second by the witness, the third by the court, and the fourth by the president king of an unjust Government.”
    il Erosion,
  2. Micro-Climatic Changes,
  3. Loss of Flora and Fauna,
  4. Changes in Spawning Grounds,
  5. Land slips, situation and sedimentation,
  6. The water logging and solirity.
  7. Impact on aquatic ecosystem.
  8.  The constitution referred to by the petitioner is stated to have been constituted as a part of in-house procedure. The inquiry ordered and the report made to the Chief Justice of India being confidential and discreet is only for the purpose of his information and not for the purpose of disclosure to any other person. It is no doubt true that in a democratic framework free flow of information to the citizens is necessary for proper functioning particularly in matters, which form part of a public record. But right to information is not The Hon’ble Court been conscious of its constitutional obligation issued effective orders to ensure the protection of the environment absolute. The claim for a direction to any professional and independent investigating agency to conduct an inquiry into the said alleged incident cannot be accepted because appropriate course for the petitioner would be to approach the authorities concerned as enumerated in Art. 217 of the Constitution. (Paras 3, 4 and 6)  If the petitioner can substantiate that any criminal offence has been committed by any of the Judges mentioned in the course of the petition, appropriate complaint can be lodged before a competent authority for taking action by complying with requirements of law. There is hardly any need for the Supreme Court to give any such direction in the matter. Therefore, this petition is not being entertained. (Para 7). Indira Jaisingh v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (2003) 5 SCC 494: (2003) 3 KLT 198.    Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651, Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commr., Ulhasmagar Municipal Corpn. (2000) 5 SCC 287, W. B. S E B v. Patel Engg. Co. Ltd. (2001) 2 SCC 451 and LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre (1995) 5 SCC 482: AIR 1995 SC 1881.       The legal right of an individual may be founded upon a control or a statute or an instrument having the force of law. For a public law remedy enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions of the authority need to fall in the realm of public law – be it a legislative act of the State, an exercise act of the State or an instrumentality or a person or authority imbued with public law element. The question is required to be determined in each case having the aforementioned principle in mind. However, it may not be possible to generalize the nature of the action, which would come either under public law remedy or private law field nor is it desirable to give exhaustive list of such actions. “There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give necessary directions where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised the direction conferred upon it by a statute or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant considerations or by ignoring the relevant considerations and materials or in such a manner as to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or the policy for implementing which such discretion has been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or pass orders and give directions to compel the performance in a proper and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the parties concerned, the court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion.”  “Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is requested to be issued, inter alia, to compel performance of public duties, which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. Statutory duty may either directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words, ‘shall’, or ‘must’. But this is not conclusive as ‘shall’ or ‘must’ have, sometimes, been interpreted as ‘may’. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the statute in which the ‘duty’ has been set out. Even if the ‘duty’ is not set out clearly and specifically in the statute, it may be implied as correlative to a ‘right’.   In the performance of this duty, if the authority in whom the discretion is vested under the statue, does not act independently and passed on order under the instructions and orders of another authority, the Court would intervene in the matter, quash the order and issue a mandamus to the authority to exercise its own discretion.”    “Obligatory duties must be distinguished from discretionary powers. With the latter mandamus has nothing to do: it will not, for example, issue to compel a minister to promote legislation. Statutory duties are by no means always imposed by mandatory language with words such as ‘shall’ or ‘must’. Sometimes they will be the implied counterparts of rights, as where a person ‘may appeal’ to a tribunal has a correlative duty to hear and determine the appeal. Sometimes also language which is apparently merely permissive is construed as imposing a duty, as where ‘may’ is interpreted to mean ‘shall’. Even though no compulsory words are used, the scheme of the Art may imply a duty.    Having developed from a piece of purely administrative machinery, mandamus was never subject to the misguided notion which at one time afflicted its less fortunate relative certiorari, that it could apply only to ‘judicial’ functions. Administrative or ministerial duties of every description could be enforced by mandamus. It was, indeed, sometimes said that this remedy did not apply to judicial functions, meaning that where a public authority was given power to determine some matter, mandamus would not lie to compel it to reach particular decision. The law as to this is explained below under ‘Duty to exercise jurisdiction’.   The fact that the statutory duty is directory as opposed to mandatory, so that default will not invalidate some other action or decision, is no reason for not enforcing it by mandamus.”   “However, this concept of democracy as rights-based with limited governmental power, and in particular of the role of the courts in a democracy, carries high risks for the judges and for the public. Courts may interfere inadvisably in public administration. The case of Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council (1983) 1 AC 768: (1982) 1 ALL ER 129: (1982) 2WLR 62 (HL) is a classic example. The house of Lords quashed the G L C cheap fares policy as being based on a misreading of the statutory provisions, but were accused of themselves misunderstanding transport policy in so doing. The courts are not experts in policy and public administration – hence Jowell’s point that the court should not step beyond their institutional capacity (Jowell, 2000). Acceptance of this approach is reflected in the judgements of Laws, L. J. in International Transport Roth GmbH v. Secy.        In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248. Dealing with the scope and purport of Article 19 (1) the Bench held: (SCC pp. 306-07, para 29)     [E]ven if a right is not specifically named in Article 19 (1), it may still be a fundamental right covered by some clause of that article, if it is an integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as that fundamental right. It is not enough that a right claimed by the petitioner flows or emanates from a named fundamental right or that its existence is necessary in order to make the exercise of the named fundamental right meaningful and effective. Every activity which facilitates the exercise of a named fundamental right is not necessary comprehended in that fundamental right nor can it be regarding as such merely because it may be possible otherwise to effectively exercise that fundamental right. What is necessary to be seen is, and that is the test which must be applied, whether the right claimed by the petitioner is an integral part of a named fundamental right or partakes of the same basic nature and character as the named fundamental right so that the exercise of such is in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right. If this be the correct test, the right to go abroad cannot in all circumstance be regarded as included in freedom of speech and expression.      Article 19 – Burden of Prove – Nature and Extent of Right – Distinguished form statute rights – Dhram Dutt v. Union of India (2004) Vol. 1 SCC 712 – a restriction on the activities of the Association is not a restriction on the activity on the individual citizen forming membership of Association – Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001 under challenged – Right and Restriction to be dealt with Article 19 (2) to (6) Article 300–A and 19 (1) (f) – Tibia Collage case AIR 1962 SC 448 followed. Society is incapable of holding property.  That Article 14 has a pervasive potency and a versatile quality, equilitarian in its soul, but allergic to discriminatory dictates. It is well known that equality is anti-thesis to arbitrariness. Since the license may not be given to a blind man to drive a car, how worthwhile it may be to give the similar license to a criminal to do every sort of atrocities being committed by indulging into the crime of the innocent people. There are inherent restrictions applicable for the enforcement of the individual personal right under article 19, which empowers the state to enforce reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right of the people in the interest of sovereignty, integrity of India security of the state, friendly relations with foreign state, public order, decency or morality etc. including the incitement to an offence pertaining to the reasonable restrictions regarding freedom of speech and expression, to assemble ,to form associations and freedom to reside and move freely throughout the territory of India. That by the constitution (first amendment) Act 1951, there have been further restrictions to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business for professional or technical qualification as well as carrying on any occupation, trade or business by the state and its instrumentality to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens. Thus the question arises as to whether there may not be a valid test of classification based on qualities or characteristics necessarily coupled with the object of legislation based on intelligible differential, which has certain nexus with the realities of the time to dealt with the law and order situation by providing necessary restriction over the unchecked liberty granted to the individual detrimental to its integrity and sovereignty for prohibition to avail the benefit of equality clause by taking the rescue for forbid classification. . There cannot be any enforceable fundamental right to an individual for indulging in anti national activities. Thus the verdict given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Limited Vs Union of India 1980 (3) SCC 625 is required to be reviewed for effective enforcement of the duties caste upon the citizen by passing through the test of "Form and Object" and "Pith and Substance" to mould and replace by the test of "Direct and Inevitable" effect.